The Power of a Bad Example - A Field Experiment in Household Garbage Disposal by Dur, A.J. (Robert) & Vollaard, B. (Ben)
TI 2012-061/1 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 
 
The Power of a Bad Example - A Field 
Experiment in Household Garbage 
Disposal 
 
 
 
Robert Dur1 
Ben Vollaard2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1Erasmus University Rotterdam, Tinbergen Institute, CESifo, and IZA; 
2 Tilburg University, CentER, and TILEC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tinbergen Institute is the graduate school and research institute in economics of Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, the University of Amsterdam and VU University Amsterdam. 
 
More TI discussion papers can be downloaded at http://www.tinbergen.nl 
 
Tinbergen  Institute has two locations: 
 
Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 1600 
 
Tinbergen Institute Rotterdam 
Burg. Oudlaan 50 
3062 PA Rotterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)10 408 8900 
Fax: +31(0)10 408 9031 
 
Duisenberg school of finance is a collaboration of the Dutch financial sector and universities, with the 
ambition to support innovative research and offer top quality academic education in core areas of 
finance. 
DSF research papers can be downloaded at: http://www.dsf.nl/ 
 
Duisenberg school of finance 
Gustav Mahlerplein 117 
1082 MS Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
Tel.: +31(0)20 525 8579 
 
 
The Power of a Bad Example – A Field Experiment 
in Household Garbage Disposal* 
 
Robert Dur† and Ben Vollaard‡ 
 
July 3, 2012 
 
Abstract 
Field-experimental studies have shown that people litter more in more littered environments. 
Inspired by these findings, many cities around the world have adopted policies to quickly 
remove litter. While such policies may avoid that people follow the bad example of litterers, 
they may also invite free-riding on public cleaning services. This paper reports the results of 
a natural field experiment where, in a randomly assigned part of a residential area, the 
frequency of cleaning was reduced from daily to twice a week during a three-month period. 
Using high-frequency data on litter at treated and control locations before, during, and after 
the experiment, we find strong evidence that litter begets litter. However, we also find 
evidence that some people start to clean up after themselves when public cleaning services 
are diminished. 
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1. Introduction 
 
When a person breaks the law, he often inflicts more damage to society than just the direct 
negative consequences of his act. The transgression may be an invitation for others to also 
break the law. This knock-on effect constitutes an additional negative externality from illegal 
behavior. 
 
As a case in point, consider littering. In most countries, littering is illegal and punishable by 
a fine. A litterer spoils a neighborhood’s appearance and, in the longer run, harms the 
environment. In addition to these direct negative externalities, litterers set a bad example for 
others to follow. Mimicking may arise for several reasons. First, some people may simply 
imitate other people’s behavior, thinking that “If everyone is doing it, it must be a sensible 
thing to do.” (Cialdini et al. 1990: 1015). Second, people may infer from observing litter that 
littering is tolerated by the police and by the community at large, thus reducing the fear for 
formal and social sanctions (Kahan 1997). Third, people may behave in a conditionally 
cooperative manner (Gächter 2007), and so may be discouraged to contribute to a clean 
environment when they observe that others did not do so. Last, preferences for cleanliness 
may be nonconvex (Anderson and Francois 1997), meaning that the decline in well-being 
from an additional piece of litter is relatively small when the environment is already littered 
as compared to when the environment is clean. 
 
These behavioral spillover effects can give rise to negative feedback loops, transforming a 
clean and orderly neighborhood into a dirty and messy place. A series of experimental 
studies have provided evidence supporting this idea. In these studies, researchers 
experimentally induced variation in the amount of litter present at places like grocery stores 
(Geller et al. 1977), picnic areas (Crump et al. 1977), a waiting room for participants to a lab 
experiment (Kraus et al. 1978), a parking garage (Reiter and Samuel 1980, Cialdini et al. 
1990, and Reno et al. 1993), an amusement park (Cialdini et al. 1990), the lobby of a 
dormitory on a university campus (Cialdini et al. 1990), an academic department’s common 
room (Ramos and Torgler 2010), and an alley in a large shopping area (Keizer et al. 2011).1 
With a few exceptions (Crump et al. 1977 and Reno et al. 1993), these experimental studies 
find that people litter significantly more often in littered environments as compared to clean 
                                                 
1 Finnie (1973) and Schultz et al. (2011) also study littering in clean and dirty areas, but the cleanliness of the 
area is not experimentally varied, making it impossible to infer causal relationships. 
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environments.2 In most studies, the effect is substantial. For instance, in Cialdini et al. (1990: 
1017)’s study into littering of a handbill that was tucked under the windshield wiper of 
parked cars, 11 percent of subjects litter in a clean environment whereas 41 percent of 
subjects do so in a littered environment. 
 
Based on the findings from these one-shot, small-scale field experiments, it has often been 
argued that frequent clean-ups of public places yield a double dividend (Reiter and Samuel 
1980, Cialdini et al. 1990, Huffman et al. 1995, and Anderson and Francois 1997). First, the 
frequent clean-ups ensure that litter is quickly removed. Second, the resulting litter-free 
environment may keep people from further littering. As Anderson and Francois (1997) put it, 
government provision of cleaning efforts can crowd in rather than crowd out private 
contributions to a clean environment. Several local governments have followed this advice 
and have implemented intensive periodic cleaning programs in residential and nonresidential 
areas alike. Many practitioners believe that such programs have been highly effective in 
discouraging littering (Lewis et al. 2009, Schultz and Stein 2009, and Ouiller and Sauneron, 
2011). 
 
Yet, other studies suggest that a strategy of frequent public cleaning may backfire. In line 
with the standard theory of private provision of public goods (Bergstrom et al. 1986), some 
empirical evidence suggests that government clean-ups of public spaces invites free-riding 
by citizens. For example, surveys conducted in the US reviewed by Beck (2007) suggest that 
people litter more if they know that someone else will clean up after them. Similar findings 
are reported by Lewis et al. (2009) for the UK. They note that “many people think that if 
someone else is paid to clean up […] then littering can be justified. More specifically, those 
questioned often named this “someone else” as the local authority.” (Lewis et al. 2009: 19). 
Clearly, if many people think along these lines, government provision of cleaning efforts 
will increase rather than decrease littering. 
 
In this paper, we put the two conflicting theories of how people respond to publicly provided 
cleaning services to the test. We report the results of a natural field experiment where, in a 
                                                 
2 Cialdini et al. (1990) provide some evidence that the effect is nonlinear: a single piece of litter seems to make 
an anti-litter norm more salient than a completely clean environment. They also find that the positive effect of a 
heavily littered environment on littering is significantly greater when people observe an experimental 
confederate littering (see also Reno et al. 1993). Keizer et al. (2008) show that also other signs of disorder, such 
as unreturned shopping carts standing around in disarray in a parking garage and illegally set off fireworks, 
cause littering. 
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randomly assigned part of a residential area, public cleaning services were drastically 
reduced during a period of three months. In contrast to the existing one-shot experiments, 
which focus on the spontaneous behavioral response, the repeated setting allows for learning 
effects on the side of residents. The experiment took place in Rotterdam, the second largest 
city in The Netherlands, from December 2010 to February 2011. Using high-frequency data 
on litter at treated and control locations before, during, and after the experiment, we examine 
whether people litter more when the environment is less often cleaned up, how this behavior 
develops over time, and whether it is persistent after the treatment has ended.3 
 
The focus of our study is on littering around underground containers for collection of 
household garbage in a densely populated area. The containers feature a lid that is to be 
opened to dispose of garbage. Putting garbage on the street is illegal and subject to a 115 
euro fine. Discarded household items that are too big to be put into the container should 
either be brought to a nearby garbage collection depot or be picked up by municipality 
workers after making an appointment by telephone, at no charge. 
 
Despite the fine and the free legal alternatives, littering around underground containers 
occurs frequently. In surveys, littered streets feature highly on residents’ lists of greatest 
annoyances, together with speeding, dog dirt, illegal parking, and nuisance from youth (IVM 
2009). In response to this public concern and inspired by some of the above-mentioned 
experimental studies, the municipality decided a few years ago to provide cleaning services 
at all container locations in the area on a daily basis rather than the regular frequency of two 
or three times a week. Our experimental treatment is to abandon these extra services and to 
return to the regular cleaning frequency in a randomly assigned part of the area for a period 
of three months, while keeping the frequency of emptying the container constant. The 
natural setting of the experiment does not allow us to isolate the specific behavioral 
mechanisms driving the response to a change in public cleaning services. Our primary aim is 
to put previous work on behavioral mechanisms to the test within people’s own habitat, with 
particular attention to crowding in versus crowding out of private contributions to a public 
good. 
 
                                                 
3 We do not consider effects on other offenses or other outcomes because of data limitations. 
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The results of our field experiment are as follows. First, using high-frequency data on litter 
at treatment and control locations, we find strong evidence that litter begets litter. The effect 
is substantial: not cleaning a location in the morning increases the likelihood of encountering 
additional litter at the location the next morning by about fifty percent. While this result 
lends strong support to the hypothesis that public cleaning services crowd in private 
contributions, we also find evidence for crowding-out effects from data on the number of 
telephone appointments for pick-up of discarded household items, one of the legal 
alternatives to littering. We find that the reduction in cleaning activities increases the number 
of appointments by about a third. Hence, our findings suggest that the provision of public 
cleaning services crowds in private contributions to a clean environment of some people, but 
crowds out private contributions of others, with the former effect dominating the latter. 
 
Our paper contributes to several strands in the literature. First, we make a contribution to the 
empirical literature on littering behavior, a literature that we briefly reviewed above. Existing 
studies are limited to short-term interventions (lasting one day or less) and focused on 
people’s spontaneous response (to litter or not to litter). Our field experiment is the first to 
study the effects of an intervention that lasted several months, while also measuring behavior 
in the month after the treatment. This repeated setting allows us to study possible learning 
effects. Arguably, it takes a while before people realize that they can no longer free ride on 
frequent public cleaning services. 
  
Second, our paper contributes to a recent literature in economics showing that people tend to 
follow examples set by others. This has for instance been shown in the context of donations 
to charities (Frey and Meier 2004, Martin and Randal 2008, Shang and Croson 2009), tax 
evasion (Fellner et al. 2011), welfare participation (Bertrand et al. 2000), and in public good 
games played in laboratory experiments (Burlando and Guala 2005, Gächter 2007, 
Beckenkamp et al. 2009, Engel et al. 2011). 
 
Lastly, our paper is related to the empirical literature on private contributions to public goods 
(see Nyborg and Rege 2003 and Payne 2009 for surveys). Our findings point to a delicate 
balance between publicly provided services and voluntary contributions from citizens. Too 
low a level of public services may result in a bad equilibrium in which most citizens choose 
not to cooperate. Too high a level of public services may crowd out private contributions, 
and leave it up to the state to provide the public good. 
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the context 
and design of our experiment. Section 3 presents the econometric model and reports the 
estimation results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental design 
 
A. Littering and cleaning activities 
The experiment was conducted in a residential area of some 4,000 households within the city 
of Rotterdam, from November 29, 2010 until March 3, 2011. The residential area is part of 
Charlois, a densely populated and relatively poor city district. The area counts 41 locations 
with underground garbage containers.4 The containers are placed on the sidewalk. The part 
of the container that is visible at street level features a lid that is to be opened to dispose of 
garbage (see Figure 1). Each container serves some 60 households.  
 
[FIGURE 1] 
 
It is illegal to place garbage next to the container. Every container includes a large warning 
label stating the 115 euro fine for illegal disposal of garbage. Discarded household items that 
are too big to fit in the container should either be brought to a nearby garbage collection 
depot or be picked up by municipality workers after making an appointment by telephone. 
On average, 18 households make an appointment per week.  
 
Many times people break the law by putting large household items next to the container. It is 
tempting to take the easy way out: it takes time and effort to bring garbage to a nearby 
collection depot or to set up an appointment for pick-up. Moreover, when making an 
appointment, it often takes a few days before garbage can be picked up, implying that people 
need to store garbage in their house or backyard for some time (as a matter of fact, 
appointments could be made for Tuesdays only). When garbage is illegally placed on the 
sidewalk, it is almost always put next to the container rather than somewhere else on the 
sidewalk. Supposedly, the container is a safe location: at this common collection point it is 
close to impossible to trace the offender, quick removal is secured since this is where service 
                                                 
4 The total number of containers in the area equals 70: the 41 locations include 15 with one container, 23 with 
two containers, and three with three containers. 
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workers stop to clean up, and neighbors may be less annoyed by items placed next to the 
container rather than someplace else (e.g. in front of someone’s door). 
 
Why someone would place a garbage bag next to a container is less obvious. If one takes the 
effort of bringing a bag all the way from home to the container, then why not put the bag into 
the container? Based on observations of residents and non-structured interviews with 
residents and service workers, we deduced three reasons. First of all, it is a way of avoiding 
the effort of opening the lid and pulling the lever. It is a small effort, but it requires the use of 
some force and one may get his hands wet or dirty. Second, people sometimes put garbage 
bags next to the container because the container is stuck or full. Lastly, illegally disposed 
garbage may simply block access to the container. Leaving alone rare situations of piles of 
garbage next to the container, residents are always able to reach the container and open the 
lid.5 Further note that, even if a container is stuck or full or cannot be accessed, it is still 
illegal to put garbage next to the container. In those cases, citizens are supposed to use a 
nearby container. Alternative container locations are rarely more than one block away.  
 
The garbage containers are emptied two or three times a week, either in the early morning or 
the late afternoon, according to a fixed schedule. Most of the containers in the area are 
emptied on Monday and Thursday afternoon. Before emptying, the area around the 
containers is cleaned of all litter. That is necessary to prevent litter from falling into the 
exposed underground space when the container is being emptied. In addition to the clean-up 
before emptying, the area around the containers is cleaned every morning by a crew of two, 
both of them driving a small truck. Taken together, it was standard practice to clean the area 
around the containers at least once a day, and sometimes even twice a day. 
 
B. Data collection 
Littering around the garbage containers was monitored twice daily on weekdays from 
Monday, September 20, 2010 until Friday, April 1, 2011. During these six months, the same 
two non-uniformed observers monitored the area, firstly from 8.00 to 9.30 am, which is 
before the daily cleaning round in the morning, and secondly from 1.30 to 3.00 pm. For each 
of the container locations, the observers noted the number of garbage bags next to the 
container as well as the number of discarded items such as household appliances and 
                                                 
5 Based on the data collection that we discuss in the next paragraph, we conclude that in 90 percent of the cases 
that litter is present, the number of bags and discarded household items is equal to 3 or less. 
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furniture. They also noted whether the container was stuck or full. Whether a container is 
stuck rather than full is not always easy to determine, this is why we created one indicator 
for the two conditions. 
 
In the two months before the start of the intervention, on average 24 percent of locations 
were littered with one or more bags or garbage items at the time of the morning round and 9 
percent of locations at the time of the afternoon round. The containers were stuck or full 13 
percent of the time in the morning and 6 percent in the afternoon on average during the 
baseline period. The distribution of littering over locations was roughly stable, but heavily 
skewed. The reasons for why some locations tend to be more littered than others within the 
same neighborhood and sometimes even the same street are not clearly understood. 
Correlational evidence suggests that the number of homes with a view on the container and 
distance to shops are positively related to the cleanliness of a location (details are available 
upon request). 
 
C. Treatment and randomization procedure 
To examine how littering behavior changes in response to public cleaning services, the 
frequency of cleaning around the garbage containers was reduced for a period of three 
months in a randomly assigned part of the area. The daily cleaning by the crew of two in the 
morning was cancelled in the treatment area. As a consequence, cleaning was reduced from 
one or two times a day to two or three times a week. The treatment was not communicated to 
residents so as to avoid confounding effects arising from communication. Hence, the main 
channel by which residents learn about cleaning activities is the cleanliness of the area 
around the garbage container. Since most residents dispose of their garbage multiple times 
per week, and also live in close proximity to the container, they have frequent exposure to 
the condition of this area.6 Some residents may also have noticed that the two service 
workers no longer clean up litter around the garbage container in the morning. 
 
The lower frequency of cleaning in the morning increased the presence of litter in the early 
afternoon. During the experiment, with the morning cleaning round cancelled, presence of 
litter in the early afternoon strongly increased in the treatment group (from 8 to 21 percent of 
locations) and remained stable in the control group (from 10 to 11 percent of locations). We 
                                                 
6 Clearly, residents in both the treatment and control area are also exposed to conditions at container locations 
that they do not use, which may lead to treatment dilution. 
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focus the empirical analysis on the accumulation of garbage next to the container from the 
early afternoon until the next morning. During these hours build-up of litter is not distorted 
by cleaning activities, except when the container is emptied late afternoon. We drop all 
observations of build-up from afternoon to next morning that are distorted by cleaning 
activities. This way the number of hours during which garbage is built up is similar across 
observations.  
 
Garbage can be either bags or household items. We are mainly interested in the overall 
response in littering behavior to the treatment, but we will report responses for bags and 
household items separately as robustness checks. Given the heterogeneity in illegally 
disposed items, with some items tiny and others large, we create an indicator variable that is 
one in case of build-up of any type of garbage and zero otherwise. Another advantage of 
using this indicator variable rather than the number of accumulated items is that it is not 
distorted by the disposal of several items by one individual. If litter begets litter, then we 
expect build-up of garbage at more locations when the cleaning frequency is reduced 
compared to the control area. If people learn to clean up after themselves, then we expect to 
see build-up of garbage at fewer locations compared to the control area in the long run. 
 
For every week, we have four observations of the build-up of garbage per container location: 
Monday to Tuesday, Tuesday to Wednesday, Wednesday to Thursday, and Thursday to 
Friday.7 As mentioned above, we exclude observations for locations that were cleaned in the 
afternoon due to scheduled emptying of the container. These regular cleaning activities 
distort the build-up of garbage from the early afternoon until the next morning. The 2 or 3 
days per week that the containers are emptied differ from location to location. Since a great 
majority of the containers are emptied on Monday and Thursday afternoon, we exclude the 
build-up from Monday to Tuesday and from Thursday to Friday completely. Another reason 
to exclude these observations is enforcement activities in the afternoon that were scheduled 
for Mondays and Thursdays in both the control and treatment area. These activities, albeit at 
a low level and conducted haphazardly, includes removal of garbage bags to search for 
address labels, distorting the build-up of garbage. In total, we have observations for 50 days 
                                                 
7 We exclude data on build-up from Friday to Monday because cleaning activities take place throughout the 
neighborhood on Sundays. 
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for the period September 20, 2010 until April 1, 2011. The total number of observations 
including the month after the treatment is equal to 1,730.8 
 
Randomization happened at the group level rather than the individual level. Logistical 
constraints made co-location of treatment locations necessary. That meant that the residential 
area had to be cut in two parts. The cut of choice was the one for which the two parts were 
most similar in terms of presence of illegally disposed garbage in the early afternoon in the 
months before the start of the intervention. A coin toss determined which of the two halves 
was chosen as treatment group. The treatment group includes 21 container locations; the 
other 20 locations serve as control group. Figure 2 presents a map of the area. In the 
sensitivity analysis, we show spatial correlation between co-located container locations not 
to be an issue: our results are robust to collapsing the data to two groups – treatment and 
control. 
 
[FIGURE 2] 
 
Table 1 summarizes the baseline characteristics of container locations in our sample. As 
discussed above, the randomization was targeted at balance in the presence of garbage in the 
early afternoon. The percentage of locations that were littered in the afternoon was similar 
between the two areas before the start of the intervention (September 20-November 26, 
2010). In the treatment group, litter was observed at 8 percent of locations in the early 
afternoon; in the control group at 10 percent of locations. An F-test shows the two averages 
not to be statistically significantly different. The empirical analysis is based on a related 
outcome variable; the build-up of garbage from early afternoon to the early morning the next 
day. Build-up of garbage from early afternoon to early morning the next day was somewhat 
larger in the control area than in the treatment area. The difference is not statistically 
significant, however. Naturally, in the empirical analysis, we control for pre-existing 
differences in the build-up of garbage.9 
                                                 
8 Over the course of four months, we miss one day due to sickness of the observers and one day due to a late 
start of their morning round. We miss one day in the week before the start of the treatment, because of 
miscommunication to the service workers about the nature of the treatment. Due to adverse weather conditions 
in December, cleaning activities were altered during two days, resulting in another two missing days (December 1 
and 8, 2010). Finally, we miss one day due to closure of garbage containers around New Year’s Eve. 
9 Occasionally, the registered amount of garbage declined. This happened 4% of the time during the baseline 
period. In the empirical analysis, these observations are classified as “no build-up of garbage”. Our results do 
not change when we code these observations as missing. 
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[TABLE 1] 
 
Further evidence for balance between treatment and control is provided by a survey on crime 
and disorder conducted in 2009 (IVM, 2009). 131 randomly selected households from the 
area were interviewed for the survey, 70 in the treatment area and 61 in the control area. 
Table 2 presents the items from the survey that are related to our study. Perceived disorder 
from littering, worry about crime, age of residents, and employment status are not 
statistically significantly different between the two areas. Given the similarity in the actual 
and perceived presence of litter before the experiment, we conclude that the randomization 
was successful in achieving balance between the treatment and control group. 
 
[TABLE 2] 
 
The estimated treatment effect of less frequent public cleaning may be confounded in two 
ways, both dealing with activities other than removal of garbage by services workers who do 
the cleaning round in the morning. First, it is possible that containers are stuck more often in 
the treatment area during the treatment period. Occasionally, the service workers pull the 
lever of the container when it seems stuck, fix a container that has become stuck, or take out 
garbage that is sitting in the opening of a stuck container. With the morning round cancelled 
during the treatment, greater accumulation of garbage next to the container from the early 
afternoon to the next morning may simply be the result of a greater frequency of stuck 
containers in the early afternoon in the treatment area relative to the control area. If so, our 
results are mainly driven by the specific design of the container, limiting the external validity 
of our results. To exclude this channel, we include an indicator of a container being stuck or 
full in the early afternoon as an additional covariate in the estimation equation in the 
sensitivity analysis. We find this to be of no consequence to our results.10 
 
Second, there was a change in the level of law enforcement. The reduced frequency of 
cleaning lowered the level of law enforcement in the treatment area because the two service 
workers regularly open garbage bags to search for the identity of the offender. If they find 
sufficient evidence that links a bag to a household, they impose a 115 euro fine. The fine 
                                                 
10 We cannot rule out, however, that residents see the presence of garbage next to the container as a signal of 
the container being stuck or full. This could be an additional channel explaining our results. 
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arrives in the mail two weeks later. For lack of similar identifiers, people who illegally 
dispose household items can only be caught in flagrante, which almost never happens. 
Community service provider Stadstoezicht Rotterdam provided us with container-level data 
on fines for illegal disposal of garbage. The data show that the number of fines per container 
location per month was more than halved in the treatment area during the experiment, 
whereas it remained more or less stable in the control area. The effect on littering is likely to 
be small, however, because of the very low number of fines. Before the experiment, per 
month some 25 out of the 4,000 households received a fine for illegal disposal of garbage, 
which comes down to about one per location every two months on average. Given the 
number of bags observed, the implied chance of getting caught is smaller than 1 percent. 
Data for previous years show similar low number of fines. Still, to prevent a possible 
estimation bias, we include the number of fines per location as a covariate in the estimation 
equation in the sensitivity analysis, and find it to be inconsequential for our results. 
 
In theory, the brief presence in the morning of two service workers may have a deterrent 
effect in and of itself. If so, there may be an upward bias in the estimated effect of reduced 
cleaning on littering behavior. This potential bias is limited because of the low level of law 
enforcement, the short time of the visit of the two workers, the fact that they also had to 
drive through a couple of treatment streets on their daily route during the experiment, and the 
focus of the empirical analysis on what happens from the afternoon until the next morning, 
i.e. in the absence of the service workers. 
 
3. Econometric model and estimation results 
 
A. Non-parametric evidence 
To analyze how littering behavior changed as a result of the reduced frequency of cleaning, 
we non-parametrically estimate the difference in build-up of garbage between the control 
and treatment area for each day before, during and after the experiment. This flexible 
estimation framework allows us to analyze trends before the start of the intervention, 
changes in the behavioral response during the months of the intervention, and persistency in 
the behavioral response after cleaning frequency went back to its original level. We estimate 
the following equation: 
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IሺΔLi,tൌ1ሻ	ൌ	∑ ܦ୲்ୀଵ i,t	αt	൅	γi	൅	δt	൅	εi,t       (1) 
 
IሺΔLi,tൌ1ሻ is an indicator function which is one in case of build-up of garbage from the early 
afternoon until the next morning of day t at container location i and zero otherwise. Di,t are 
daily dummy variables which are one for container locations in the treatment area and zero 
for container locations in the control area. We include container location-fixed effects γi to 
control for location-specific factors driving accumulation of litter that are constant over time. 
We include day-fixed effects δt to account for common shocks in littering, such as weather 
conditions and official holidays. εi,t is the idiosyncratic error. 
 
[FIGURE 3] 
 
In Figure 3 the daily coefficients, αt, from estimation equation (1) are plotted in light gray – 
as open dots during the treatment period and closed dots outside the treatment period. On the 
horizontal axis, time 0 corresponds with the first day of the experiment (November 29, 
2010). The vertical axis shows the percentage point difference in build-up of garbage 
between the treatment and control area. The coefficients are estimated relative to the first 
day for which we have data (September 22, 2010).11,12 The separately estimated monthly 
coefficients, plotted in black and superimposed on the daily coefficients in Figure 3, 
illustrate the major trend in littering behavior before, during, and after the intervention. 
 
First of all, Figure 3 shows the absence of a difference in trend between treatment and 
control before the start of the treatment, which is in line with the common trend assumption 
underlying causal interpretation of the parameter of interest. Second, we find littering to go 
up sharply as soon as cleaning services are reduced. Build-up of litter at container locations 
goes up by some 10 percentage-points on average. The figure suggests that the frequency of 
positive build-up increased by about 50 percent (the baseline frequency is 18.5%, see Table 
1). Below, we conduct a test whether the average rate of littering during the experiment in 
the treatment area relative to the control area is statistically significantly different from zero. 
Finally, Figure 3 suggests some persistency in behavior: littering behavior does not return to 
its original level once the cleaning round in the morning is re-established – at least not in the 
                                                 
11 As discussed in Section 2, monitoring started two days earlier. We exclude Mondays and Tuesdays, which is 
why the first observation is for Wednesday, September 22. 
12 We scale the coefficients to the mean difference in build-up during the baseline period. 
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first month after the intervention for which we have data. Residents show an immediate 
response to less frequent cleaning of litter, but seem slow in adjusting to more frequent 
cleaning. 
 
B. Average treatment effect 
Next, we test whether the treatment had on average a statistically significant effect on 
littering behavior. We estimate the following equation: 
 
IሺΔLi,tൌ1ሻ	ൌ	αTi,t	൅	γi	൅	δt	൅	εi,t        (2) 
 
where T is the treatment dummy, which is one in the experimental area during the 
intervention period and zero otherwise. Other than replacing the daily dummies by T, 
estimation equation (2) is identical to equation (1). Parameter of interest α is the estimated 
change in incidence of accumulation of garbage from the afternoon to the morning the next 
day.  
 
Table 3 presents the estimation results. We find that the incidence of littering is on average 9 
percentage points higher when the cleaning frequency is reduced. The effect is statistically 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level. In the second column of Table 3, we allow the 
size of the treatment effect to vary during the intervention period. As can be expected from 
the pattern in littering behavior observed in Figure 3, the estimated coefficient for the second 
half of the period is similar to the coefficient for the first half of the period. A Wald-test 
shows that the difference between the two parameter estimates is not statistically 
significantly different from zero. 
 
We test for post-intervention persistency in the behavioral effect of the treatment in the third 
column of Table 3. Some of the theories discussed in the introduction naturally predict that 
treatment effects do not disappear immediately when the frequency of cleaning returns to its 
regular level. Particularly, it may take a while before citizens’ beliefs about the risk of 
formal and social sanctions and about other people’s contributions to a clean environment 
adjust to the new context. Further, it may take some time before people realize that the local 
government is again cleaning up on a daily basis. We find weak evidence for persistency. 
During the first month after the treatment has ended, the treatment effect is of similar size to 
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the treatment effect during the intervention. The coefficient is statistically significantly at the 
90 percent confidence level. 
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
C. Evidence for crowding-out 
The results so far lend strong support to the hypothesis that public cleaning services crowd in 
private contributions. The data on litter at treatment and control locations clearly show that 
when public cleaning services are diminished, private contributions to a clean environment 
go down on average. The average treatment effect may hide contrasting behavioral 
responses, however. To further analyze crowding effects, we focus on the use of a legal 
alternative for disposal of garbage: making a telephone appointment for pick-up of discarded 
oversized household items. If crowding in holds, then we expect to see a fall in the number 
of telephone appointments in response to the treatment. In the case of crowding out, we 
expect to see the reverse. Community service provider Roteb provided data on these 
telephone appointments. The data are weekly as appointments could be made for Tuesdays 
only. Moreover, the data relate to all of the treatment area and all of the control area rather 
than to specific container locations. 
 
Similar to the analysis of build-up of illegally disposed garbage, first we non-parametrically 
estimate the effect of the treatment on the number of appointments. We estimate the 
following equation: 
 
Ai,t	ൌ	∑ ܦ୲்ୀଵ i,t	αt	൅	γi	൅	δm	൅	εi,t                   (3) 
 
where Ai,t is the number of appointments for pick-up of discarded household items made in 
area i and week t. Di,t are weekly dummy variables that are one for the treatment area and 
zero for the control area. We include area-fixed effects γi and month-fixed effects	δm.13 
 
Figure 4 plots the weekly coefficients, αt, from estimation equation (3) in light gray. On the 
horizontal axis, time 0 corresponds with the first week of the experiment (first week of 
                                                 
13 Given the number of parameters to be estimated in equation (3), we opt for month-fixed effects rather than 
week-fixed effects. Later, when we estimate the average treatment effect, we use week-fixed effects (equation 
4).  
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December, 2010). For purposes of illustration, we extend the time window that we have used 
so far with an additional 6 weeks before and 6 weeks after the period of the daily monitoring 
of illegal disposal of garbage (August, 2010-May, 2011). The vertical axis shows the 
difference in the number of telephone appointments for pick-up of discarded household 
items between the treatment and control area. The coefficients are estimated relative to the 
first week for which we have data on appointments.14 To illustrate the major trend in the 
number of appointments, we separately estimate monthly coefficients, which are plotted in 
black in Figure 4 and superimposed on the weekly coefficients. 
 
[FIGURE 4] 
 
In line with the common trend assumption and similar to our analysis of build-up of illegally 
disposed garbage in Figure 3, we do not observe a trend before the start of the treatment in 
Figure 4. As soon as cleaning services are reduced, we find the number of telephone 
appointments to go up in the treatment area relative to the control area. An increase in the 
number of appointments is in line with the crowding-out hypothesis. At least some residents 
seem to have learned that discarded household items are no longer quickly removed when 
they are put next to the container. Own initiative is necessary to make sure that those 
discarded items disappear. During the treatment period, discarded items such as couches and 
appliances could be seen in the street for days. Apparently, these items served as visible 
pointers to the residents, which resulted in the observed change in behavior. 
  
This finding stands in contrast to the average treatment effect that we found before. The 
effect is also small relative to our previous results for illegal disposal of garbage. In the 
treatment area, the number of appointments for pick-up of discarded household items went 
up by 2 to 3 per week, while the number of container locations with build-up of garbage 
went up by about 2 per day.15 The behavioral effect is not insignificant within the context of 
this legal alternative, however. Given an average number of appointments in the treatment 
area before the start of the intervention of 8.6 per week, this amounts to about a one-third 
increase. 
 
                                                 
14 We scale the coefficients to the mean difference in the number of appointments during the baseline period. 
15 As discussed in Section 3, the frequency of build-up went up by 9%-points, from about 18.5% in the baseline 
period. With 21 container locations in the treatment area, this comes down to about 2 additional sites with 
build-up of garbage.  
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Again, in line with the findings for build-up of illegally disposed garbage, the behavioral 
effect of the treatment seems to be persistent. The number of telephone appointments in the 
treatment area relative to the control area remains higher even when the morning cleaning 
rounds are re-established. 
 
To test whether the effect of the treatment on this type of legal disposal of household 
garbage is statistically significantly different from zero, we estimate the following equation: 
 
Ai,t	ൌ	αTi,t	൅	γi	൅	δt	൅	εi,t         (4) 
	
where T is the treatment dummy, which is one in the experimental area during the treatment 
period and zero otherwise. Parameter of interest α	is the estimated change in the number of 
telephone appointments during the period of the treatment. We include area-fixed effects γi 
and week-fixed effects δt. 
 
Table 4 presents the estimation results. In the first column, we estimate the average treatment 
effect using data for the same period as in Table 3 (September, 2010-March, 2011). We find 
the number of appointments for pick-up of discarded household items to go up by about 3 in 
response to the reduced frequency of cleaning. The effect is statistically significant at the 
95% confidence level. In the second column of Table 4, we allow the size of the effect to 
vary over the treatment period. The point estimates are not statistically significantly 
different. In the third column, we also consider the month after the treatment. We find some 
evidence for persistency in the effect of the treatment on appointments. The point estimates 
for the treatment effect and the effect during the period after the intervention are similar in 
size; the latter is, however, not statistically significantly different from zero. In the last 
column, similar to Figure 4, we extend the time window of the analysis with 6 weeks before 
and 6 weeks after the period of the daily monitoring. The estimation results are similar to 
those based on the shorter period reported in column (3). The post-treatment effect on 
appointments becomes statistically significant when using this extended time window, 
providing further evidence for persistency in the behavioral effect. 
 
[TABLE 3] 
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D. Sensitivity analysis 
So far, we assumed variation in littering to be independent across the 41 container locations. 
Given the randomization at the area level rather than the container level, for reasons 
discussed in Section 2, the variation in littering among co-located container locations within 
the treatment area and within the control area may not be fully independent, rendering our 
statistical tests of the treatment effect invalid. To see how robust our results are to the 
possibility of spatial correlation among container locations within the treatment and control 
area, we collapse the data by area. In the second column of Table 5 we present the results for 
the difference-in-difference estimator. Even though we greatly reduce the number of 
observations that we use to identify the effect of the treatment, we find the results to be 
similar. This finding provides support for our assumption that spatial correlation due to co-
location of treatment and control locations does not bias our results. 
 
A particular feature of our experimental design is the great number of time periods that we 
use to estimate the treatment effect. The period before and during the treatment encompasses 
observations for 42 days over a period of four months. If we would ignore the potential serial 
correlation in observations by container location, then we would be likely to underestimate 
the standard errors (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). To address this issue, we have 
clustered the standard errors by container location in the default specification. Not clustering 
the standard errors would not lead to different conclusions, but it does lower the standard 
errors by some 10 percent. An alternative solution to the potential problem of serial 
correlation is to collapse the time series information into a pre- and post-period. The results 
are presented in the third column of Table 5. Even though the number of observations is 
greatly reduced, we still find the effect to be statistically significantly different from zero at 
the 90 percent confidence level. The standard errors are similar to those of the default 
specification, suggesting that we successfully correct for potential serial correlation within 
clusters. 
 
In the fourth and fifth column of Table 5, we estimate the treatment effect separately for 
garbage bags and for discarded household items. We find both estimated coefficients to be 
positive but statistically insignificant. When studying the data at this disaggregated level, the 
incidence of illegal behavior becomes too small to identify the treatment effect in a very 
18 
 
precise way. However, the estimated effects relative to the mean build-up for the two types 
of garbage suggest that residents respond similarly to the treatment, justifying our outcome 
measure that combines the two. 
 
As discussed in section 2, the treatment effect of less frequent public cleaning services may 
be confounded in two ways, by a change in law enforcement and by a change in the 
frequency of stuck or full containers. The sixth and seventh column of Table 5 report 
estimates of the treatment effect when controlling for these factors. First, in the sixth 
column, we include the number of fines per location as a covariate in the estimation equation 
in the sensitivity analysis. We lag the effect by 14 days because of the time it takes to 
process the fine. We assume the fine to have an effect on littering for 14 days. In other 
words, we count fines written at most four weeks ago and at least two weeks ago.16 As can 
be seen from the sixth column of Table 5, controlling for fines does not affect the estimated 
treatment effect. Likewise, in the seventh column of Table 5, we control for whether a 
container is stuck or full early afternoon. We find the estimated effect not to be changed, 
indicating that this specific design feature of the garbage containers is not driving our results. 
 
Lastly, from November to January, two large cargo containers were placed during the 
weekend as an extra means to dispose of discarded household items. So as not to distort the 
experiment, one container was placed in the center of the treatment area and one container in 
the center of the control area. It could be that for some unknown reason residents in one area 
made greater use of the cargo container than residents in the other area. In that case, 
estimation of the treatment effect could be biased. Community service provider Roteb 
provided us with the exact weights of the garbage collected at the two cargo containers. 
When we include these weights as covariate in the empirical analysis, we find the same 
treatment effect (see the last column of Table 5), suggesting that the two temporarily placed 
cargo containers do not affect our results. 
 
[TABLE 5] 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Our results are similar when we assume the fines to have an effect on littering behavior for more than two 
weeks. 
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4. Conclusions 
 
Litter is a serious problem in many communities around the world (Lewis et al. 2009; 
Schultz et al. 2009). Quick removal of litter is seen by many as an effective policy response, 
not only because it ensures a clean environment, but also because the presence of litter may 
encourage further littering. In this view, government provision of cleaning services crowds 
in private contributions to a clean environment, and so yields a ‘double dividend’. Others 
have argued that government provision may crowd out private contributions. Why clean up 
after yourself if government service workers stop by frequently to do the job? Existing 
empirical work on this issue provides mixed evidence. On the one hand, a number of small-
scale, one-shot field experiments show that litter begets litter. On the other hand, survey 
evidence suggests that many people think that littering can be justified if the local authority 
cleans up. 
 
We have reported the results from a large-scale and long-lasting field experiment, in which 
we experimentally reduced the frequency of public cleaning services for a period of 3 
months in people’s own habitat. Using high-frequency data on litter at treatment and control 
locations before, during, and after the treatment, we find clear support for the idea that 
government provision of cleaning services crowds in private contributions. In areas where 
the frequency of cleaning was reduced, the tendency to litter went up by almost 50 percent. 
At the same time, residents in the treatment area started to make significantly more 
appointments for pick-up of discarded household items, a legal alternative to disposal of 
garbage. This indicates that at least some people learned to clean up after themselves. 
Overall, our findings suggest that the provision of public cleaning services crowds in private 
contributions to a clean environment of some people, even in the longer term, but crowds out 
private contributions of others, with the former effect dominating the latter. 
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Table 1. Baseline characteristics and randomization check 
 N Treatment 
area 
Control area Difference 
Illegally disposed garbage present in the 
early afternoon (%)  
987 (T), 
940 (C) 
8.3 (27.6) 9.6 (29.4) -1.3 
Build-up of garbage from early afternoon to 
early morning next day (%) 
308 (T), 
326 (C) 
14.9 (35.7) 21.8 (41.3) -6.9 
Note. Data relate to baseline period (September-November, 2010) and exclude days at which a 
container location was emptied. First row includes all business days; second row relates to build-up 
from Tuesday to Wednesday and Wednesday to Thursday. Standard deviations between parentheses. 
* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level; *** 
Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
Table 2. Perceived crime and disorder and background characteristics of residents in 
treatment and control area 
 Treatment area Control area Difference 
‘In this neighborhood, roads, paths and squares 
are well-kept’ (% agree) 
46.4 (6.0) 48.3 (6.5) -2.0 
‘In this neighborhood, streets are frequently 
littered’ (% agree) 
58.6 (5.9) 55.7 (6.4) 2.8 
‘In this neighborhood, the area around garbage 
containers is frequently littered’ (% agree) 
67.1 (5.7) 60.1 (6.3) 6.5 
‘I am frequently worried about my safety in this 
neighborhood’ (% agree) 
14.3 (4.4) 12.1 (4.3) 2.2 
Age of residents† 40.6 (1.7) 41.4 (1.8) -0.8 
Paid work for more than 12 hours per week 61.4 (5.9) 57.4 (6.4) 4.1 
Number of observations 70 61  
Source: IVM (2009). 
Note. † Only residents aged 12 or over were interviewed. Standard deviations between parentheses. * 
Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level; *** 
Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 3. The effect of reduced cleaning frequency on accumulation of garbage 
Dependent variable: build-up of garbage next to 
container from early afternoon until early 
morning next day (indicator) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Treatment 0.09 (0.04)**  0.09 (0.04)** 
Treatment – first half  0.09 (0.05)*  
Treatment – second half  0.08 (0.05)*  
Treatment – post intervention   0.10 (0.06)* 
Number of observations 1,474 1,474 1,730 
Note.  Observations by container location and by day. Standard errors between parentheses corrected 
for clustering at the container level. Other covariates are container location-fixed effects and day-
fixed effects. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** Statistically significant at the 5 
percent level; *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
 
 
Table 4. The effect of reduced cleaning frequency on appointments for pick-up of discarded 
household items 
Dependent variable: number of 
telephone appointments for pick-
up of garbage 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment 3.18 (1.23)**  3.18 (1.32)** 2.71 (1.22)** 
Treatment – first half  3.90 (1.59)**   
Treatment – second half  2.67 (1.43)*   
Treatment – post intervention   2.70 (1.69) 2.53 (1.25)** 
Number of observations 44 44 54 78 
Note.  Observations by area and by week. Standard errors between parentheses. Other covariates are 
area-fixed effects and week-fixed effects. * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** 
Statistically significant at the 5 percent level; *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Table 5. Sensitivity analysis 
Dependent variable: 
build-up of garbage 
(indicator) 
(1) 
Default 
(2) 
Collapse 
to two 
areas 
(3) 
Collapse 
to two 
periods 
(4) 
Garbage 
bags only 
(5) 
Household 
items only 
(6) 
Control 
for 
fines 
(7) 
Control 
for stuck 
or full 
container 
(8) 
Control 
for use of 
cargo 
containers 
Treatment 0.09 
(0.04)** 
0.09 
(0.04)* 
0.08 
(0.04)* 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.04  
(0.04) 
0.09 
(0.04)* 
0.09 
(0.04)** 
0.09 
(0.04)** 
Number of 
observations 
1,474 84 82 1,474 1,474 1,474 1,474 1,474 
Note.  Observations by container location and by day and standard errors between parentheses 
corrected for clustering at the container level, except for (2) and (3). Column (6) includes as a 
covariate the number of fines for illegal disposal of garbage written at most four weeks ago and at 
least two weeks ago. Column (7) includes an indicator of a stuck or full container in the early 
afternoon as covariate, column (8) the weights of garbage disposed at temporarily placed cargo 
containers. Other covariates are area-fixed effects and day-fixed effects (column 2), container 
location-fixed effects and period-fixed effects (column 3), and container location-fixed effects and 
day-fixed effects (all other columns). * Statistically significant at the 10 percent level; ** Statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level; *** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
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Figure 1. Underground garbage container 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Map of the area 
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Figure 3. Difference in accumulation of garbage between treatment and control area, by day 
and by month 
 
Note. Graph plots coefficients αt from estimation equation (1). Daily coefficients are in light gray; 
separately estimated monthly coefficients are in black. 
 
Figure 4. Difference in number of appointments for pick-up of discarded household items 
between treatment and control area, by week and by month 
 
Note. Graph plots coefficients αt from estimation equation (3). Weekly coefficients are in light gray; 
separately estimated monthly coefficients are in black. 
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